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Abstract— Ad-hoc wireless networks are an exciting 
research direction in sensing and pervasive computing. 
Advance security work in this area has beenprimarily 
focused on denial of communication at the routing or 
medium access control levels. There is a common attack at 
routing protocol layer, i.e. resource depletion attack, which 
permanently disables networks by drastically draining 
nodes’ battery power. These “Vampire” attacks are not 
similar to any specific protocol, but rather depend upon the 
properties of many popular classes of routing protocols like 
link state and DSR protocols. These vampire attacks are 
very difficult to detect, devastating and easy to carry out 
using as few as one malicious insider sending only protocol 
compliant messages. For mitigation of these kinds of 
attacks, some methods are explained, including a new 
proof-of-concept protocol that provably bounds the damage 
caused by Vampires during the packet forwarding phase. 
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I. RELATED WORK 
In wireless ad hoc networks there is a need to forward the 
packets from one to another. Each mode acts as a router in 
wireless ad hoc network. That means it must follow some 
routing protocols. It maintains the routing information like 
source address, destination address, data etc. The existing 
routing protocols like ARIADNE, SAODV, and SEAD do 
not protect against vampire attacks.ARIADNE[2] is an on-
demand secure ad hoc routing protocol based on DSR that 
withstands node compromise and relies only on highly 
efficient symmetric cryptography.  
ARIADNE[2] guarantees that the target node of a route 
discovery process can authenticate the initiator, that the 
initiator can authenticate each intermediate node on the path 
to thedestination present in the RREP message and that no 
intermediate nodecan delete a previous node in the node list 
in the RREQ or RREP messages.As for the SRP protocol, 
ARIADNE needs some mechanism to bootstrap authentic 
keys required by the protocol. In particular, each and every 
node needs a shared secret key (KS, D) is the shared key 
between a source S and a destination D) with each node it 
communicates with at a higher layer, an authentic TESLA 
key for each node in the network and an authentic “Route 
Discovery chain” element for each node for which this node 
will forward RREQ messages. There are some features like: 
 i. ARIADNE provides point-to-point authentication of a 
routing message using a message authentication code 
(MAC)and a shared key between the two parties.  
ii. For authentication of a broadcast packet such as RREQ, 
ARIADNE uses the TESLA broadcast authentication 
protocol  
iii. Selfish nodes are not taken into account.  
ARIADNE copes with attacks performed by malicious 
nodes that modify and fabricate routing information, with 
attacks using impersonation and, in an advanced version; 
with the wormholeattack .ARIADNE is protected also from 
a flood of RREQ packets that could lead to the cache 
poisoning attack. ARIADNE is not vulnerable to the 
wormhole attack only in its advanced version: using an 
extension called TIK (TESLA with Instant Key disclosure) 
that requires tight clock synchronization between the nodes, 
it is possible to locate anomalies caused by a wormhole 
based on timing discrepancies.  
The Secure Ad hoc On Demand distance Vector (SAODV) 
[3] protocol is an extension of the AODV protocol. The 
Secure AODV scheme is based on the premise that each 
node possesses certified public keys of all network nodes. 
The originator of the routing control packet appends its 
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RSA signature and the last element of a hash chain to the 
routing packets. A packet transverse the network, 
intermediate nodes cryptographically authenticates the 
signature and the hash value. The intermediate nodes 
generate the kth element of the hash chain, with k being the 
number of transverse hops, and place it in packet.   The 
SAODV[3] protocol gives two alternatives for ROUTE 
REQUEST and ROUTE REPLY messages. In the first case 
when a ROUTE REQUEST is sent, the sender creates a 
signature and appends it to packet. Intermediate nodes 
authenticate the signature before creating or updating the 
reverse route to the host. The reverse route is stored only 
when the signature is verified. When the node reaches the 
destination, the node signs the ROUTE REPLY with its 
private key and sends it back. The intermediate nodes again 
verify the signature .The signature of the sender is again 
stored with the along with the route entry.  
There are some features for SAODV: 
i. Ownership of certified public keys enables intermediate 
enable intermediate nodes to authenticate all in-transit 
routing packets.  
ii. The protocol operates mainly by using the new extension 
message with the AODV protocol.  
iii. The SAODV can be used to protect the route discovery 
mechanism of the AODV by providing security features 
like integrity, authentication. 
Hu, Perrig and Johnson presented a proactive secure routing 
protocol based on the Destination-Sequenced Distance 
Vector protocol (DSDV). In a proactive (or periodic) 
routing protocol nodes periodically exchange routing 
information with other nodes in attempt to have each node 
always know a current route to all destinations. SEAD [4] 
authenticates the sequence number and metric of a routing 
table update message using hash chains elements. In 
addition, the receiver of SEAD routing information also 
authenticates the sender, ensuring that the routing 
information originates form the correct node. The source of 
each routing update message in SEAD must also be 
authenticated, since otherwise, an attacker may be able to 
create routing loops through the impersonation attack.     
SEAD deals with attackers that modify routing information 
broadcasted during the update phase of the DSDV-SQ 
protocol: in particular routing can be disrupted if the 
attacker modifies the sequence number and the metric field 
of the routing table update message. SEAD makes use of 
efficient one-way hash chains rather than relying on 
expensive asymmetric cryptography operations. SEAD 
assumes some mechanism for a node to distribute an 
authentic element of the hash chain that can be used to 
authenticate all the other elements of the chain. 
Rushing attack occurs in on-demand routing protocols like 
DSR, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing 
(AODV) where route discovery is done by forwarding 
REQUEST messages to the neighboring nodes. In rushing 
attack, the malicious node sends the REQUEST message 
much faster when compared to the legitimate node. This 
results in wrong route discovery and the packet is not sent 
to the destination. To prevent this attack trust oriented 
secured AODV protocol is used where a trust threshold 
value is incorporated on the misbehaving node and based on 
the trust value, the misbehaving node can be isolated. 
Another method is to use Rushing Attack Prevention (RAP) 
protocol.  
Vampire attacks [1]  are mitigated by used a new proof of 
protocol at the routing protocol layer during packet 
forwarding phase. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
WSN is typically an ad hoc network of nodes with sensing 
abilities. So many routing protocols proposed for ad hoc 
networks could also be used for WSNs. The characteristics 
of WSNs are discussed from two perspectives: from the 
nodes that make up the network, and from the network 
itself.  
 
Fig:1 wireless sensor network 
 A wireless sensor network is a collection of nodes 
organized into a cooperative network. Each node consists of 
processing capability (one or more microcontrollers, CPUs), 
may contain multiple types of memory (program, data and 
flash memories), have a RF transceiver (usually with a 
single Omni-directional antenna), have a power source (e.g. 
batteries and solar cells), and accommodate various sensors 
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and actuators. The nodes communicate wirelessly and often 
self-organize after being deployed in an ad hoc fashion. 
A wireless ad hoc network isa decentralized type 
of wireless network [5]. The network is ad hoc because it 
does not rely on a pre-existing infrastructure, such 
as routers in wired networks or access points in managed 
(infrastructure) wireless networks. Instead, 
each node participates in routing by forwarding data for 
other nodes, so the determination of which nodes forward 
data is made dynamically on the basis of network 
connectivity. In addition to the classic routing, ad hoc 
networks can use flooding for forwarding data. 
An ad hoc network typically refers to any set of networks 
where all devices have equal status on a network and are 
free to associate with any other ad hoc network device in 
link range. Ad hoc network often refers to a mode of 
operation of IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. 
The very idea of a wireless network introduces multiple 
venues for attack and penetration that are either much more 
difficult or completely impossible to execute with a 
standard, wired network. This inherent limitation makes 
WSNs especially sensitive to several key types of attacks. 
In contrast to resource-rich networks such as the Internet, a 
WSN is less stable, more resource-limited, subject to open 
wireless communication, and prone to the physical risks of 
in-situ deployment. These factors increase the susceptibility 
of WSNs to distinct types of attacks.   
   Although there are many factors (software and hardware 
bugs, environmental conditions) that could diminish the 
capacity of the network to provide the requisite service, 
there is the possibility that the service is denied as a result 
of being attacked by an adversary.  
 
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
A. PLGPa: 
It adds a verifiable path history to every PLGP 
packet.PLGPa uses this packet history combined with 
PLGP’s tree routing structure so every node can securely 
verify progress which anticipates any significant adversarial 
influence on the path taken by any packet which traverses at 
least one veracious node. These signatures form a chain 
attached to every packet and allows any node receiving it to 
proveits path. To ensure that the packet has never travelled 
away from its destination in the logical address space, every 
forwarding node verifies the attestation chain. PLGPa 
satisfies no-backtracking- All messages are signed by their 
originator. Attacker can only alter packet fields that are 
changed enroute, so only the route attestation field can be 
altered, shortened, or deleted entirely. Use one-way 
signature chainconstruction to prevent truncation. PLGPa 
never floods and its packet forwarding overhead is 
favorable. It exhibits more equitable routing load 
distribution and path diversity. Even without hardware, the 
cryptographic computation required for PLGPa is tractable 
even on 8-bit processors. 
Some important things about PLGPa: 
• It is PLGP with attestation 
Each packet has a verifiable path history 
• It holds backtracking 
• It is resistant to vampire attacks 
. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are many resource depletion attacks as explained in 
literature survey. The most dangerous attack is vampire 
attack. This kind of attacks suddenly decreases the battery 
life of nodes and may even destroy the network 
permanently. These attacks are somewhat reduced by using 
the PLGPa method during packet forwarding phase. 
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